By Jason T. Johns

Convenience accounts are joint accounts, usually checking or savings accounts, that are held in joint tenancy between the “true owner” and someone else where the “true owner” did not intend for the other joint tenant to have an interest in the account.  In re Estate of Harms, 236 Ill.App.3d 630,634 (4th Dist. 1992).

In the case, In re Estate of Shea, the court held that the joint tenant’s belief that the decedent wanted her to receive the joint account at the decedent’s death showed the decedent lacked the intent to make a present gift at the time the joint account was established, and thus the account was a convenience account and belonged in the decedent’s estate.  In re Estate of Shea, 364 Ill.App.3d 963, 969-970 (2nd Dist. 2006).  “Any kind of side agreement that significantly changes the ownership from the statutory joint tenancy is contrary to the presumption [of donative intent], because then the instrument would not be speaking the whole truth.”  Estate of Shea, 364 Ill.App.3d at 970 (emphasis in the original).  Further, the conduct of the joint tenants during the decedent’s life also showed that the account was set up as a convenience and not with the intent to make a present gift.  The court in the Estate of Shea held that the joint account was a convenience account and thus should be included in the decedent’s estate.  Id. at 974-975.

However, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Frey v. Wubbena, found that joint accounts where the true owner lacked the intent to make an inter vivos gift, but did intend to make a testamentary gift, are true joint tenancy accounts and are not convenience accounts.  Frey v. Wubbena, 26 Ill.2d 62, 71-72 (1962).  The Court stated “This is the essence of joint tenancy, and if such thoughts of the contingencies make the contract void as testamentary, then there is no such thing as a joint tenancy in a bank account in this state.”  Frey, 26 Ill.2d at 72 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also  Harms, 236 Ill.App.3d at 634-635;  In re Estate of Flecken, 266 Ill.App.3d 1087, 1093-094 (1st Dist. 1994) (“the petitioner need not claim any interest in the stock during the decedent’s lifetime in order to claim an interest as a surviving joint tenant.”).

With a convenience account, the “true owner” intends that the other joint tenant perform transactions only at the “true owner’s” direction.  In re Estate of Shea, 364 Ill.App.3d 963, 970 (2nd Dist. 2006);  Vitacco v. Eckberg, 271 Ill.App.3d 408 (1st 1995).  The idea is that the other person is on the account as a convenience to the “true owner” – to write checks and pay bills, at the direction of the decedent.  Harms, 236 Ill.App.3d at 634; Wilkening, 109 Ill.App.3d at 943.

The point of inquiry regarding intent is at the creation of the joint account.  If the donor changes her mind later, that does not indicate she lacked donative intent when the account was created.  Flecken, 266 Ill.App.3d at 1094-095.  In Flecken, the donor even attempted to severe the joint tenancy in a chancery action, but died before that was accomplished.  Thus, the court in Flecken held that the joint account passed to the surviving joint owner, not the decedent’s estate.

While the point of inquiry is the origination of the account, the actions of the parties after the creation of the joint account may be used to demonstrate the intent when the joint account was established.  For example, one fact considered by the court in Price v. State was that the purported trustee never reported on his income tax return any interest earned on the assets since he claimed he did not own the money.  Price v. State, 79 Ill.App.3d 143, 145 (1st Dist. 1979).

Analysis of convenience accounts are based on facts and circumstances.  For example, the court in Wilkening held that the joint account at issue was not a convenience account because the grantor understood the effects of joint tenancy and that she made no specific request of the co-tenant to use the funds for her care.  In addition, there was a close relationship between the two joint tenants which caused the court to consider donative intent warranted.  Wilkening, 109 Ill.App.3d at 945-946.